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1 Introduction
A classical rationale for markets is that they allow gains from trade to be realized; at the
very least, no agent can be made worse o than her initial holding. However, this basic
comparative static only holds generally when starting from autarky. If a group of agents
trade some goods on the market, but others are untraded, opening markets in the untraded
goods can potentially hurt some of the agents. The intuition for this is simple: opening
trade in new goods can alter the equilibrium price of already traded goods to accommodate
the potential tradeos for newly traded goods.
In the international trade literature, this is known as a negative terms-of-trade eect
(see Krugman, Obstfeld and Melitz 2012 for example). A related phenomenon occurs in
the context of nancially incomplete markets. Hart (1975) oers an example establishing
that opening a market in new securities result in a Pareto loss. Elul (1995) and Cass and
Citanna (1998) have shown that this worsening is generic.
A very basic question remains. While unregulated markets do not in general produce
gains from trade except in the special case of autarky, there may be room for transfers or
subsidies or regulations which allow such a result to be restored more generally. To this
end, our question does not take the competitive market solution in the Walrasian sense
as given. We ask: Is it possible to allocate resources, allowing redistribution of income or
resources and any other compensation or any price regulation, so that that opening trade
in new goods never makes anybody worse o?
Somewhat surprisingly, we show that the answer is generally negative under certain
domain richness conditions. To qualify this statement, we rst ask what our social choice
function (SCF) should or has to meet.
First, we ask that our SCF always respect weak Pareto eciency, conditional on each
given trading opportunity. This corresponds to the idea of constrained eciency in the
literature of general equilibrium theory.
Secondly, we impose an informational/institutional constraint that SCF only take into
account preferences and endowments of traded commodities. We call this constraint (rather
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than a normative postulate) Independence of Untraded Commodities.
In practical partial equilibrium mechanism design, the planner isolates the objects of
allocation from the rest of the economy and consider the agent's preferences over those ob-
jects alone, assuming that other things remain equal. Such an assumption is in general not
compatible with standard requirements, because preferences are generally not separable.
Marginal preferences over objects on the table alone are only part of the story.
Nevertheless, in many real life situations we have to take this misspecication as a
given institutional constraint, in the sense that individuals are forced to behave as if their
preferences are separable, and partial equilibrium mechanism design is subject to such a
constraint. Any SCF going beyond this constraint would require extreme bureaucratic in-
volvement on the part of a social planner, requiring sophisticated knowledge of preferences
over untraded commodities. We do not claim that such constraints are normatively com-
pelling. Rather, we simply point out the constraint underlying the practical arguments.
We believe this point has not received much attention, so we would like to understand how
restrictive it is.
More to the point, the revealed preference paradigm dictates that if commodities are
not tradeable, it is by denition impossible to infer preferences over these commodities from
choice behavior. Hence, if we interpret preference in the standard way as a representation
device for choice behavior, the condition is a necessary requirement for any mechanism in
the environment we study. Removing the condition would result in a framework involving
elements which cannot be identied economically.
Now, the Walrasian solution, for example, satises these two properties. As our third
and nal condition, we also ask that nobody be made worse o when opening markets to
trade in new goods. We call this No Loss from Trade.
We obtain two results. Imagine that we extend the SCF in two steps, rst from autarky
to a class of smaller sets of commodities and second to the entire set of commodities, where
the preference domain satises certain minimal richness conditions. Our rst result is that
as long as we accept the Walrasian solution in the rst step, it is impossible to extend the
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SCF in the second step in a manner which does not hurt anybody, even when arbitrary
compensation or regulation is permitted.
The second result does not require acceptance of the Walrasian solution in the rst step.
However, we establish that gains from trade requires there to be a dominant individual who
reaps all of the gains; all other agents remain at the welfare level of their endowment.
Related literature
Our result is related to several results in the literature in social choice in exchange economies,
for example Moulin and Thomson (1988). A major theme of this literature relates to
whether everybody can benet systematically when the set of available objects increases
somehow. The aforementioned result establishes that, in an exchange economy environ-
ment without endowments, it is very hard for each agent to benet when more of each
commodity is introduced. Our result follows this theme by considering the introduction of
new commodities, rather than introducing more of existing commodities.
In a setting of social evaluation of allocations when the set of commodities is variable,
Donaldson and Roemer (1987) propose an axiom stating that the social ranking over allo-
cations of any subset of commodities should be unchanged as far as individuals' preferences
over consumptions of the subset remain the same, given any xed allocation of the rest
of the commodities. Our independence axiom is weaker than theirs, in the sense that
we do not take arbitrary allocations of untraded commodities, since in our setting when
commodities are not tradable individuals just consume their initial endowments of those.
Our independence axiom may resemble an independence axiom proposed by Fleurbaey
and Tadenuma (2007), stating that in the setting of variable sets of physically present
commodities only preferences over physically present commodities should matter. The
dierence here is that we x the set of physically present commodities and vary the sets
of tradable commodities, where individuals consume their initial endowment of untradable
commodities. Also, we view our independence axiom as a natural constraint rather than
as a normative postulate.
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2 Model and axioms
2.1 Model
Let I be the set of individuals. Let X be a nite set of commodities which are physically
present in the world. Fix a list of initial endowments ! = (!1;    ; !jIj) 2 RIX++ , and let

 =
P
i2I !i. Let [0;
] = fz 2 RX : 0  z  
g, where 0 2 RX denotes the zero vector.
Let R be the set of convex and strongly monotone preferences over RX+ , and for each
i 2 I let Di  R be the domain of i's preferences. Let D =
Q
i2I Di be the domain of
preference proles. We will discuss the properties D satises later.
Let T  2X be the family of admissible sets of tradable commodities. We assume
; 2 T . For each T 2 T , let [0T ;
T ] = fzT 2 RT : 0T  zT  
Tg, where 0T 2 RT denotes
the T -dimensional zero vector and 
T is the T -component of 
.
An economy is a pair (%; T ), which consists of a list of preference relations %= (%1
;    ;%jIj) 2 D and a set of tradable commodities T 2 T . We take DT to be the domain
of economies.
Further, let F (T )  RIX+ denote the set of feasible allocations when T is tradable.
Formally,
F (T ) =
8<:x 2 RIX+ :
P
i2I xik 
P
i2I !ik; 8k 2 T
xik = !ik; 8i 2 I; 8k 2 T c
9=; :
A social choice function (SCF) is a mapping ' carrying each economy (%; T ) 2 D  T
into an element of F (T ). An SCF species how trade in any given economy should be
undertaken. The use of an abstract rule allows us to study the properties we wish our
allocations to satisfy.
For later purpose we introduce the following notation. Let
P (xi;%i) = fzi 2 [0;
] : zi i xig
R(xi;%i) = fzi 2 [0;
] : zi %i xig
PT (xi;%i) = fziT 2 [0T ;
T ] : (ziT ; !iT c) i xig
RT (xi;%i) = fziK 2 [0T ;
T ] : (ziT ; !iT c) %i xig
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for each i and T 2 T . P (xi;%i) and R(xi;%i) denote strict and weak upper contour
sets above xi, respectively, for preference %i in the Edgeworth box [0;
]. PT (xi;%i) and
RT (xi;%i) denote strict and weak upper contour sets above xi, respectively, for preference
%i in [0T ;
T ], which is the cross-section of the Edgeworth box taken in the ane subspace
corresponding to T .
2.2 Axioms
We list here our properties for SCFs. The rst states that, for any given economy, it should
be impossible to reallocate tradable resources in a fashion that makes everybody strictly
better o.
Axiom 1 (Weak Pareto): For all (%; T ) 2 D  T , there is no x 2 F (T ) such that
xi i 'i(%; T ) for i 2 I.
The second condition is our motivating criterion: when opening up trade in new com-
modities, nobody should be hurt.
Axiom 2 (No Loss from Trade): For all %2 D and T; T 0 2 T with T  T 0, we have
'i(%; T 0) %i 'i(%; T )
for all i 2 I.
Note that no loss from trade implies the following individual rationality axiom:
Axiom 3 (Individual Rationality): For all (%; T ) 2 D  T ,
'i(%; T ) %i !i
for all i 2 I.
Finally, we specify our informational/institutional constraint. Formally this is an inde-
pendence condition, specifying that only the preferences over tradable commodities should
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be taken into account. Any SCF not satisfying this property will necessarily require thor-
ough bureaucratic involvement to gather preference information on non-marketed goods.
It is a positive restriction placed on any mechanism in the environment we study, rather
than a normative postulate. The reasoning here follows the revealed-preference paradigm.
Recall that preferences are simply a summary of choice behavior: it is only conceptually
possible to infer preferences over objects amongst which individuals may choose. Even
ignoring the strategic issues with many agents, if it is impossible to trade some commodity,
it is by denition impossible to infer an individual's preferences over that commodity.
Hence, the need for such a constraint.
This type of independence condition can also be viewed as a formal notion capturing
the idea of partial equilibrium analysis. Trade liberalization typically can take place only
in a gradual manner, in which we do not see the nal goal. In such circumstances a
\partial equilibrium" approach isolates the issue under consideration from the rest of the
economy, ignoring preferences over non-marketed goods, as if preferences are separable.
The assumption of separability is in general false, and marginal preferences over objects
on the table alone depend on consumption of other goods. However, in many real life
situations we have to take such misspecication as a given institutional constraint.
Given %i2 Di and T 2 T , let %i jT denote the ordering over RT+ dened by
x %i jTy () (x; !iT c) %i (y; !iT c)
for all x; y 2 RT+. Given %2 D and T 2 T , let % jT = (%i jT )i2I .
Axiom 4 (Independence of Untraded Commodities): For all %;%02 D and T 2 T ,
if % jT =%0 jT then
'(%; T ) = '(%0; T ):
Related to the revealed preference justication of the condition, independence of un-
traded commodities is related to a condition of immunity to manipulation. To see this,
suppose that when the SCF is applied to T 2 T and the social planner let each individ-
ual reports her preference. The preferences over consumption of commodities in T are
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known to the social planner and cannot be misreported, as such information is presumably
revealed during the trading process via demand choices. However, the individuals may
misreport other aspects of preferences involving untraded commodities T c, since they can-
not be revealed via demand choices. For example, they may misreport (i) rankings over
consumption of T c, and (ii) the marginal rate of substitution between T and T c even when
the rankings over consumptions of T c are known. The latter kind of misrepresentation may
be used to claim that one receives a relatively low level of \utility" from the consumption
of goods in T c, and hence he should receive more \utility" from T . Under the minimal
domain richness conditions we introduce later, only the latter kind of information will be
relevant as the source of manipulation.
The condition below states that the SCF should be immune to such manipulation.
Axiom 5 (Strategy-Proofness with respect to Untraded Commodities): For all
%2 D and T 2 T , for all i 2 I and %0i2 Di with %i jT =%0i jT it holds
'i(%; T ) %i 'i(%0i;% i; T ):
The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 1 Independence of Untraded Commodities implies Strategy-Proofness with re-
spect to Untraded Commodities.
Examples of SCFs satisfying all but one of the properties follow.
Example 1 No-trade solution which gives '(%; T ) = ! for all (%; T ) 2 D T satises
No Loss from Trade, Independence of Untraded Commodities but violates Weak Pareto.
Example 2 Monotone path solution is dened as follows. For all %2 D, x a prole
of utility representations u = (ui)i2I .
For all (%; T ) 2 D  T , dene
'(%; T ) 2 arg max
x2F (T )
min
i2I
ui(xi);
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where the selection when multiplicity occurs is arbitrary.
This satises Weak Pareto, No Loss from Trade but violates Independence of Untraded
Commodities. The reason this violation occurs is because the prole of utility functions
depends on the preference prole under consideration. In order to guarantee independence,
two preference proles which induce the same preferences on T 2 T should therefore map
to the same induced utility functions on T 2 T . In general, there is no way to construct a
system of utility functions, depending on preference proles, which has this property.
Example 3 Consider any selection of the Walrasian solution, in which the selection in
the case of multiplicity depends only on the induced preference over the tradable commodi-
ties.
This satises Weak Pareto, Independence of Untraded Commodities but violates No
Loss from Trade.
To illustrate the result, let us describe the following natural procedure, which all
economists will nd familiar and obviously results in gains from trade at each stage. Start
from autarky. Open trade in a collection of commodities and nd a Walrasian equilibrium.
Now, open trade in a collection of new commodities, taking the old Walrasian equilibrium
as the endowment. Find a new Walrasian equilibrium. It is clear that all individuals will
be made better o at each stage here, so it is instructive to ask how our primitives preclude
this rule.
The issue is the following. Suppose we have two disjoint sets of commodities, K and Kc.
Depending on which set of commodities we open trade to rst, the resulting nal allocation
will be dierent. There is a path dependence of the previous procedure on the order in
which trade is opened. This means that, in general, the procedure we demonstrated cannot
be compatible with a rule which works independent of path.
And in fact, this is roughly the main source of diculty leading to our result. The agents
that benet from trading in the set of commodities K can be quite dierent from those that
benet from trade in Kc. However, the allocation resulting from trade in all commodities
in X should give all agents a consumption bundle that is weakly preferred to both the
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bundle obtained under K and the bundle obtained under Kc. However, the preferences on
X may exhibit arbitrarily strong complementarities between the commodities of group K
and those of group Kc. Hence, the utility of an average of the allocations assigned under
K and Kc can then be arbitrarily close to the minimum of the utilities under K and Kc;
and it is not possible to satisfy the no loss from trade axiom.1
3 The minimal domain richness conditions
Before proceeding, it is worth attempting to convey some of the intuition of our construc-
tion, and explicitly state the domain richness conditions. It is an extraction of critical
situations in which \partial equilibrium" improvement in one place and \partial equilib-
rium" improvement in another place cannot lead to an overall improvement when they are
taken together, and any overall improvement requires a \leap" directly toward the goal and
cannot be done in a piecewise manner.
Imagine two disjoint sets of commodities, K and Kc. Imagine that a social planner has
information as to the preferences over these commodities, passing through the endowment
point. In general, one would suspect there are many degrees of freedom in \completing"
these preferences. That is, we would think that there are many preferences over X which
induce the given preference proles over K and Kc.
We have one obvious restriction on the preference over X. The indierence curve
over X which passes through the endowment must intersect the indierence curves of the
original preference proles over K and Kc which pass through the endowment. This is a
matter of denition. Now, take the convex and upper comprehensive hull of the indierence
curves passing through the endowment over K and Kc. This looks almost like an upper
contour set for a preference over X, except in general it is not strictly monotone. In order
to be compatible with our domain restrictions, we need to be able to ensure that there
is an indierence curve over X passing through the indierence curves over K and Kc
1We are grateful to an anonymous referee from the American Economic Review for suggesting this
intuition.
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which is strictly monotone. It eases our argument to make sure the upper contour set of
this indierence curve is as \small" as possible; that is, it is as close to the convex hull
described as possible.
Now, consider a bundle of goods xK in commodity space K, and another bundle xKc in
Kc, such that each bundle is strictly preferred to the endowment in each commodity space.
There is nothing tying the indierence curves passing through these two points in the two
dimensions together|they are totally disjoint. It seems reasonable that we may therefore
complete the preference so that this pair is ranked arbitrarily. That is|we can eectively
choose the marginal rate of substitution between the goods K and Kc to be whatever we
want. In fact, more seems to be true. For any continuous utility representations of the
preferences over K and Kc which agree at the endowment, we can complete the preference
relation to agree with these utility functions. The construction would consist of taking,
for any utility level, the convex and upper comprehensive hull of the preferences giving at
least that utility on the two commodity subspaces and then \extending" the preference
elsewhere to retain strict monotonicity and continuity.
These arguments seem intuitive, and we believe them to be true on the domain of convex,
continuous, strictly monotone preferences. Unfortunately, we were unable to come up with
a general proof, while we give some specic examples of domain constructions below. The
diculty stems from nding a general procedure for guaranteeing strict monotonicity and
continuity of a preference relation outside of the convex hulls we discussed in the previous
paragraph. Fleurbaey and Tadenuma (2007) use a similar extension construction, except
they do not have to worry about what happens outside of these convex hulls. The reason
is that their induced preferences always appear on the boundary of commodity space; the
convex hull construction covers the entire space.
In light of these diculties, we have isolated the conditions necessary for the completion
of our argument. These are what we term the \minimal richness condition." As we stated,
we believe this condition is satised by the domain of convex, strictly monotone, and
continuous preferences. At the same time, to ensure that the conditions are not vacuous,
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we have demonstrated the existence of a domain satisfying them.
Our main result is then a characterization theorem, establishing that a mechanism
satisfying the properties must feature one individual maximizing their preference subject to
the other individual's rationality constraints. And, even on the domain of all continuous,
strictly monotone, and convex preferences, this result will hold when restricted to the
domain we consider. This, at the very minimum, tells us that on the full preference domain
there is no mechanism which is Pareto ecient, satises our independence condition, and
results in strict gains from trade to all individuals whenever possible.
Our argument will require that the domain of admissible preferences be suciently
\rich." To ensure the result is as powerful as possible, we postulate a pair of relatively
weak richness conditions.
First, we restrict attention to a simple family of admissible sets of tradable commodities.
Minimal Richness Condition (MRC) 1: Assume jXj  4. Let K  X with 2 
jKj  jXj   2, and assume
T = f;; K;Kc; Xg:
To illustrate, imagine a two-step procedure in which the society starts with autarky and
the rst step is to choose between applying the SCF to K or to Kc, and the second step is
to extend the SCF to the entire set of commodities X (see Figure 1).2
The second condition is about minimal richness of the preference domain.
Minimal Richness Condition (MRC) 2: For all i 2 I:
(i) For all %i;%0i2 Di, it holds %i jK =%0i jK and %i jKc =%0i jKc ;
(ii) For all %i2 Di and any xed xi 2 RX+ , there exists %i2 Di such that R(xi;%i ) is
2The argument can be extended to more general situations as follows. There are two distinct sets of
commodities K and K 0, and the status-quo is to trade K \K 0. The problem is if we can achieve an overall
improvement by trading K[K 0 in the end through piecewise trade liberalization of either K nK 0 or K 0nK.
The critical situation here is such that piecewise improvements do not lead to an overall improvement, and
we have to \leap" directly from K \ K 0 to K [ K 0, instead of going through K or K 0. The current
specication is an extraction of such key structure.
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Figure 1: Admissible sets of tradable commodities
arbitrarily close to
co (RK(xi;%i) f!iKcg [ f!iKg RKc(xi;%i)) ;
in the sense that the Hausdor distance between them becomes arbitrarily small.
(iii) For all %i2 Di and any xi 2 RX+ such that (xiK ; !iKc) i !i and (!iK ; xiKc) i !i,
there exist %0i;%00i2 Di such that
(xiK ; !iKc) 0i (!iK ; xiKc)
and
(xiK ; !iKc) 00i (!iK ; xiKc)
hold respectively.
MRC2-(i) says that we are dealing with only a xed prole of rankings when it comes to
consumptions ofK (resp. Kc) alone given thatKc (resp. K) is untradable. This leads us to
consider only manipulations of information about marginal rates of substitution between
K and Kc. In this sense we are dealing with a quite \small" preference domain.
MRC2-(ii) says that given a preference and a consumption bundle we can nd a related
preference which is arbitrarily \more demanding." A \more demanding" preference is one
in which preference is more dicult to improve upon by allowing trades of all goods in X.
Hence the \most demanding" one is such that the corresponding upper contour set is the
convex hull, which is taken in the entire consumption space, of the two upper contour sets
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respectively in the ane subspace where K is the set of traded commodities trade and in
the one where Kc is the set of traded commodities. This most demanding preference is not
strongly monotone, so our condition says we should be able to take a strongly monotone
one which is arbitrarily close to it.
MRC2-(iii) says that the ranking between consumption of goods in K when goods in
Kc are untradable and consumption of goods in Kc when good in K are untradable is
indeterminate, provided these bundles are strictly individually rational.
The following observation is easy to see.
Lemma 2 Under Minimal Richness Condition 1 and 2, Independence of Untraded Com-
modities implies that for all %;%02 D it holds
'(%; K) = '(%0; K)
and
'(%; Kc) = '(%0; Kc):
Here is a more specic construction of preference domain which satises MRC1 and
MRC2.
Example 4 Construct Di for each i 2 I as follows.
1. Fix concave and strictly increasing functions viK : RK+ ! R and viKc : RKc+ ! R.
2. For any i 2 (0; 1), let
ui(xiji) = i (viK(xiK)  viK(!iK)) + (1  i) (viKc(xiKc)  viKc(!iKc))
3. For any i 2 (0; 1) and "i 2 (0; 1], let
ui(xiji; "i) = max
(1 "i)V (u)+"iW (u)3x
u;
where
V (u) = co (f(ziK ; !iKc) : ui(ziK ; !iKc ji) = ug [ f(!iK ; ziKc) : ui(!iK ; ziKc ji) = ug)
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O
V (u)
(1  "i)V (u) + "iW (u)
W (u)
u
i
u
1 i
Figure 2: Construction of Dv
and
W (u) = fz : ui(zji) = ug:
4. Given a pair of functions vi = (viK ; viKc), let Dvi let be the set of preference relations
which are represented by ui(ji; "i) for some i 2 (0; 1) and "i 2 (0; 1].
5. Let
Di = Dvi
We view that the class of domains satisfying MRC2 is quite generic, since the construction
works for arbitrary viK and viKc as far as they are concave and increasing.
Let us pretend that the above convex-hull operation is done in the utility space. See
Figure 2, in which viK(xiK)   viK(!iK) is taken on the horizontal axis and viKc(xiKc)  
viKc(!iKc) is taken on the vertical axis. Here W (u) is the half space which is upper-right
to the straight line passing through

u
i
; 0

and

0; u
1 i

, whereas V (u) is the intersection
of W (u) and the non-negative orthant. Since the preference giving V (u) is not strongly
monotone, we take a convex combination (1   "i)V (u) + "iW (u) where "i is suciently
small.
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Here MRC2-(i) and (ii) are met by construction. To see that MRC2-(iii) is met, pick
any i 2 I, i 2 (0; 1) and "i 2 (0; 1]. Suppose
ui(xiK ; !iKc ji; "i) = i (viK(xiK)  viK(!iK))
> 0 = ui(!iji; "i)
and
ui(!iK ; xiKcji; "i) = (1  i) (viKc(xiKc)  viKc(!iKc))
> 0 = ui(!iji; "i)
Then one can take 0i 2 (0; 1) such that
ui(xiK ; !iKc j0i; "i) = 0i (viK(xiK)  viK(!iK))
> (1  0i) (viKc(xiKc)  viKc(!iKc))
= ui(!iK ; xiKc j0i; "i);
and similarly for the opposite direction.
4 Impossibility of opening markets without hurting
anybody
Our rst result is that there is generally no system of transfers, taxes, subsidies or price
regulation which worsens nobody in the second step, once we accept the Walrasian solution
for the rst step.
Let W denote the Walrasian correspondence.
Denition 1 Say that ' is Walrasian in the rst step if
'(%; K) 2 W (%; K) and '(%; Kc) 2 W (%; Kc)
for all %2 D.
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Theorem 1 Assume MRC1 and MRC2. Also assume that for some %2 D the Walrasian
solutions W (%; K) and W (%; Kc) are single-valued and strictly individually rational.
Then there is no allocation rule which is Walrasian in the rst step and satises No Losses
from Trade.3
The assumption that Walrasian solution is single-valued and strictly individual rational at
(%; K) and (%; Kc) is not on primitives. In view of MRC2-(i), however, this is an innocuous
assumption because preferences induced over each ane subspace reduce to a xed prole
which is taken arbitrarily.
For the proof we establish the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose ' satises No Loss from Trade. For any %2 D, suppose that '(%
; K) 2 W (%; K), '(%; Kc) 2 W (%; Kc) and jW (%; K)j = jW (%; Kc)j = 1.
Then '(%; K) and '(%; Kc) are Pareto-ranked.
Proof.
Graphical intuition: To illustrate, suppose that I = fa; bg, jXj = 4 and jKj = jKcj =
2. Consider a four-dimensional Edgeworth box (which obviously has no trivial graphical
representation). So imagine its two ane subspaces, RK  f!Kcg and f!Kg  RKc , as
in Figure 3. Let (xK ; !Kc) = '(%; K) and (!K ; xKc) = '(%; Kc) here. Suppose now
(xaK ; !aKc) a (!aK ; xaKc) and (xbK ; !bKc) b (!bK ; xbKc) for the sake of contradiction.
Then, when a's indierence surface giving the indierence curve Ia passing through xK
in the left ane subspace RK  f!Kcg intersects the right ane subspace f!Kg  RKc it
gives the dotted indierence curve Ia passing strictly beyond xKc from a's viewpoint. Also,
when b's indierence surface giving the indierence curve Ib passing through xKc in the
right ane subspace f!Kg  RKc intersects the left ane subspace RK  f!Kcg it gives
the dotted indierence curve Ib passing strictly beyond xK from b's viewpoint.
Then, in the left ane subspace a's upper contour set corresponding to Ia and b's upper
contour set corresponding to the dotted Ib are separated by the budget line passing through
3The same result holds even when we replace Walrasian by so-called constrained Walrasian, meaning
that budget sets are truncated by the set of feasible allocations.
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Figure 3: Walrasian allocations
!K . Likewise, in the right ane subspace a's upper contour set corresponding to the dotted
Ia and b's upper contour set corresponding to Ib are separated by the budget line passing
through !Kc .
Now from (ii) in Minimal Richness Condition 2 we can take %2 D such that a's upper
contour set above (xaK ; !aKc) is arbitrarily close to the convex hull of the solid Ia in the
left and the dotted Ia in the right in the entire space RX , and b's upper contour set above
(!bK ; xbKc) is arbitrarily close to the convex hull of the dotted Ib in the left and the solid
Ib in the right in the entire space RX .
Then, a's upper contour set above (xaK ; !aKc) and b's upper contour set above (!bK ; xbKc)
are separated by the hyperplane spanned by the budget line in the left and the budget line
in the right, implying that they are disjoint.
No Loss from Trade requires now that '(%; X) be in both a's upper contour set and
b's upper contour set, which is impossible.
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Proof of the Lemma: Let
I1 = fi 2 I : 'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc)g
I2 = fi 2 I : 'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc)g
I3 = fi 2 I : 'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc)g
and suppose I1; I2 6= ;.
Let pK be the price vector corresponding to W (%; K). Then we have
pK!iK  inf
ziK2RK('i(%;K);%i)
pKziK
for all i 2 I.
For each i 2 I2, by assumption that 'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc), it follows RK('i(%; Kc);%i
) $ PK('i(%; K);%i). Hence we have
pK!iK < inf
ziK2RK('i(%;Kc);%i)
pKziK
for all i 2 I2.
Thus we have
pK
X
i2I
!iK <
X
i2I1[I3
inf
ziK2RK('i(%;K);%i)
pKziK
+
X
i2I2
inf
ziK2RK('i(%;Kc);%i)
pKziK
Let pKc be the price vector corresponding to W (%; Kc). Then we have
pKc!iKc  inf
ziKc2RKc ('i(%;Kc);%i)
pKcziKc
for all i 2 I.
For each i 2 I1, by assumption that 'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc), it follows RK('i(%; K);%i
) $ PK('i(%; Kc);%i). Hence we have
pKc!iKc < inf
ziKc2RKc('i(%;K);%i)
pKcziKc
for all i 2 I1.
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Thus we have
pKc
X
i2I
!iKc <
X
i2I1[I3
inf
ziKc2RKc ('i(%;K);%i)
pKcziKc
+
X
i2I2
inf
ziKc2RKc ('i(%;Kc);%i)
pKcziKc
Now take %2 Dv such that R('i(%; K);%i ) is arbitrarily close to
co (RK('i(%; K);%i) f!iKcg [ f!iKg RKc('i(%; K);%i))
for all i 2 I1 [ I3 and R('i(%; Kc);%i ) is arbitrarily close to
co (RK('i(%; Kc);%i) f!iKcg [ f!iKg RKc('i(%; Kc);%i))
for all i 2 I2
Let us assume for a moment that I3 6= ;. Then for suciently small  > 0 we have
pK!iK + pKc!iKc +  < inf
zi2R('i(%;K);%i )
pKziK + pKcziKc
for all i 2 I1 and
pK!iK + pKc!iKc +  < inf
zi2R('i(%;Kc);%i )
pKziK + pKcziKc
for all i 2 I2, and
pK!iK + pKc!iKc   jI1 [ I2j=jI3j < inf
zi2R('i(%;K);%i )
pKziK + pKcziKc
for all i 2 I3.
Since '(%; K) = '(%; K) and '(%; K) = '(%; Kc), No Loss from Trade requires
'(%; X) 2 R('i(%; K);%i )
for all i 2 I1 [ I3 and
'(%; X) 2 R('i(%; Kc);%i )
for all i 2 I2.
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Hence we have
pK!iK + pKc!iKc +  < pK'iK(%; X) + pKc'iKc(%; X)
for all i 2 I1 [ I2,
pK!iK + pKc!iKc   jI1 [ I2j=jI3j < pK'iK(%; X) + pKc'iKc(%; X)
for all i 2 I3, which imply
pK
X
i2I
!iK + pKc
X
i2I
!iKc < pK
X
i2I
'iK(%; X) + pKc
X
i2I
'iKc(%; X)
However, this contradicts to
P
i2I 'i(%; X) =
P
i2I !i.
If I3 = ; it follows from a rather stronger assertion that
pK
X
i2I
!iK + pKc
X
i2I
!iKc + jI1 [ I2j < pK
X
i2I
'iK(%; X) + pKc
X
i2I
'iKc(%; X):
Proof of Theorem 1. The conclusion of the previous lemma is impossible, since from
MRC2-(i) and MRC2-(iii) we can always take %02 D such that Wa(%0; K) a Wa(%0; Kc)
and Wb(%0; K) b Wb(%0; Kc).
Graphically speaking, in Figure 3 we can always \glue" the indierence curve Ia in the left
with an arbitrary indierence curve above xKc like the dotted Ia, and we can always "glue"
the indierence curve Ib in the right with an arbitrary indierence curve above xKc (from
b's viewpoint) like the dotted Ib.
5 A no-mutual-gains result
Our second result is that whenever the SCF satises Weak Pareto, No Loss from Trade,
and Independence of Untraded Commodities, gains from trade can be given to only one
individual in the rst step.
Here we impose another richness condition.
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Minimal Richness Condition 3: For any %2 D and any xed x 2 RIX+ such thatX
i2I
!iK =2
X
i2I
RK(xi;%i)X
i2I
!iKc =2
X
i2I
RKc(xi;%i)
and
!iK =2 RK(xi;%i)
!iKc =2 RKc(xi;%i)
for all i 2 I, there exists %2 D such thatX
i2I
!i =2
X
i2I
R(xi;%i )
The intuition of MRC3 is similar to that of MRC2-(ii). It says that given a preference and
a consumption bundle such that its welfare levels are not attainable by trading K only or
by trading Kc, we can make the preference \demanding" so that its welfare levels are not
attainable even by allowing trades of all goods in X.
One might wonder that MRC3 is implied by MRC2-(ii) through the separation argu-
ment made in the proof of Lemma 3. The critical step there was that as the individuals'
upper contour sets in each ane subspace are separated by a hyperplane passing through
the endowment point, their upper contour sets in the entire space are separated by the hy-
perplane spanned by those hyperplanes and it passes the endowment point, implying that
the corresponding Scitovsky contour set cannot contain the aggregate endowment point.
Figure 4 shows that the separation argument does not work as it is. Here the line
weakly separating the two upper contour sets in the left ane subspace must pass above
the endowment, while the separating line in the right ane subspace must pass below the
endowment. Hence the two lines cannot span a hyperplane in the entire space. To our
knowledge of mathematics, we do not know whether MRC3 is implied by MRC2-(ii) or
not, and therefore we have to take MRC3 to be a direct assumption.
Here are examples of domains which satisfy all MRC1,2,3.
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Figure 4: Failure of separation
Example 5 (Continues from Example 4): Let I = fa; bg. Let X = f1; 2; 3; 4g and K =
f1; 2g. Consider the domain Dva Dvb , where va; vb are given as follows.
Fix a1; b1; a3; b3 2 (0; 1), and for each i 2 fa; bg let
viK(xiK) = i1xi1 + (1  i1)xi2
viKc(xiKc) = i3xi3 + (1  i3)xi4
As in Figure 5, whenever two upper-contour sets truncated by the Edgeworth box in the
left for K are disjoint and they do not contain the endowment point !K they are separated
by a line passing through !K , and similarly for K
c. Therefore, one can take "0a; "
0
b 2 (0; 1)
to be suciently small so that the two upper-contour sets in the Edgeworth box for X
given by ua(ja; "0a) and ub(jb; "0b) are separated by the hyperplane spanned by the two
separating lines.
Example 6 (Continues from Example 4): Let I = fa; bg. Let X = f1; 2; 3; 4g and K =
f1; 2g. Consider the domain Dva Dvb , where va; vb are given as follows.
Fix 1; 2; 3; 4 2 (0; 1) and ! 2 RX++ such that
!a1 + !b1 = !a2 + !b2; !a3 + !b3 = !a4 + !b4:
23
-6
?

Oa
1
2
1
2
r!K
Ob
Ia
Ib
-
6
?

Oa
3
4
3
4
r!Kc
Ob
Ia
Ib
Figure 5: Example meeting MRC3: Linear Preferences
For each i 2 fa; bg, let
viK(xiK) = minf1xi1 + (1  1)xi2; 2xi1 + (1  2)xi2g
viKc(xiKc) = minf3xi3 + (1  3)xi4; 4xi3 + (1  4)xi4g
As in Figure 6, whenever two upper-contour sets in the Edgeworth box in the left for
K are disjoint and they do not contain the endowment point !K they are separated by a
line passing through !K , and similarly for K
c. Therefore, one can take "0a; "
0
b 2 (0; 1) to be
suciently small so that the two upper-contour sets in the Edgeworth box for X given by
ua(ja; "0a) and ub(jb; "0b) are separated by the hyperplane spanned by the two separating
lines.
Now we state our main result. By abandoning the Walrasian mechanism, we allow the
possibility that individuals may strictly gain in the second step. However, the exibility
aorded by richness allows us to establish that in the rst step, only one individual can
strictly gain.
Theorem 2 Assume MRC1,2,3. Assume also that for some %2 D, ! is not Pareto ecient
in (%; K) or (%; Kc). Suppose that ' satises Weak Pareto, No Loss from Trade, and
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Figure 6: Example meeting MRC3: Leontief Preferences
Independence of Untraded Commodities. Then there is i 2 I such that for all %2 D it
holds 'j(%; K) j !j and 'j(%; Kc) j !j for all j 6= i.
This result allows that more than one individual may gain from trade in the second step,
while only one dominant individual gains in the rst step. However, because we cannot
worsen this dominant individual either in the second step it puts a bound on the gains
the other individuals may get there. Such bound is particularly severe when the dominant
individual's preference is such that her welfare level is harder to improve upon by further
trade liberalization. In other words, those other individuals can gain from trade only as a
residual which \trickles-down" after the dominant individual takes her gains.
First we prove a lemma saying that the outcomes of the rule applied to two economies
with mutually disjoint sets of tradable commodities must be Pareto ranked.
Lemma 4 Assume MRC1,2,3. Suppose that ' satises Weak Pareto, No Loss from Trade,
and Independence of Untraded Commodities. Then for every %2 D, '(%; K) and '(%; Kc)
are Pareto-ranked.
Proof.
Graphical intuition: To illustrate, consider again that I = fa; bg, jXj = 4 and jKj =
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jKcj = 2. Consider again a four-dimensional Edgeworth box and imagine its two ane
subspaces, RK  f!Kcg and f!Kg  RKc like in Figure 7. Let (xK ; !Kc) = '(%; K) and
(!K ; xKc) = '(%; Kc) here. Suppose now (xaK ; !aKc) a (!aK ; xaKc) and (xbK ; !bKc) b
(!bK ; xbKc) for the sake of contradiction.
Then, when a's indierence surface giving the indierence curve Ia passing through xK
in the left ane subspace RK  f!Kcg intersects the right ane subspace f!Kg  RKc it
gives the dotted indierence curve Ia passing strictly beyond xKc from b's viewpoint. Also,
when b's indierence surface giving the indierence curve Ib passing through xKc in the
right ane subspace f!Kg  RKc intersects the left ane subspace RK  f!Kcg it gives
the dotted indierence curve Ib passing strictly beyond xK from b's viewpoint.
Then, in the left ane subspace a's upper contour set corresponding to Ia and b's upper
contour set corresponding to the dotted Ib are separated by the budget line passing through
!K . Likewise, in the right ane subspace a's upper contour set corresponding to the dotted
Ia and B's upper contour set corresponding to Ib are separated by the budget line passing
through !Kc .
From MRC3 we can take %2 D such that a's upper contour set above (xaK ; !aKc) and
b's upper contour set above (!bK ; xbKc) are disjoint and neither contains the endowment
point.
No Loss from Trade requires now that '(%; X) be in both a's upper contour set and
b's upper contour set, which is impossible.
Proof of the Lemma: Let
I1 = fi 2 I : 'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc)g
I2 = fi 2 I : 'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc)g
I3 = fi 2 I : 'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc)g
and suppose I1; I2 6= ;.
By Weak Pareto we have X
i2I
!iK =2
X
i2I
PK('i(%; K);%i)
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Figure 7: Pareto-ranking property
For each i 2 I2, by assumption that 'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc), it follows RK('i(%; Kc);%i
) $ PK('i(%; K);%i). Therefore we haveX
i2I
!iK =2
X
i2I1[I3
RK('i(%; K);%i) +
X
i2I2
RK('i(%; Kc);%i)
By Weak Pareto we haveX
i2I
!iKc =2
X
i2I
PKc('i(%; Kc);%i)
For each i 2 I1, by assumption that 'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc), it follows RKc('i(%; K);%i
) $ PKc('i(%; Kc);%i). Therefore we haveX
i2I
!iKc =2
X
i2I1[I3
RKc('i(%; K);%i) +
X
i2I2
RKc('i(%; Kc);%i)
Then we can take %2 Dev such that % jK =%K , % jKc =%Kc andX
i2I
!i =2
X
i2I1[I3
R('i(%; K);%i ) +
X
i2I2
R('i(%; Kc);%i )
Since '(%; K) = '(%; K) and '(%; Kc) = '(%; Kc) follow from Independence of
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Untraded Commodities, No Loss from Trade requiresX
i2I
'i(%; X) 2
X
i2I1[I3
R('i(%; K);%i ) +
X
i2I2
R('i(%; Kc);%i )
=
X
i2I1[I3
R('i(%; K);%i ) +
X
i2I2
R('i(%; Kc);%i );
which is a contradiction to
P
i2I 'i(%; X) =
P
i2I !i.
Here is the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof.
Graphical intuition: Consider again that I = fa; bg, jXj = 4 and jKj = jKcj = 2.
Suppose 'a(%; K) a !a and 'b(%; K) b !b.
Without loss of generality, assume that 'a(%; Kc) a !a and 'b(%; Kc) b !b hold as
well, whereas the boundary cases are treated in the formal proof.
Then we have a situation as depicted in Figure 8, where (xK ; !Kc) = '(%; K) and
(!K ; xKc) = '(%; Kc).
Then we can "glue" the indierence curve Ia in the left with an arbitrary indierence
curve above xKc like the dotted Ia, and we can "glue" the indierence curve Ib in the left
with an arbitrary indierence curve below xKc (from b's viewpoint) like the dotted Ib. Then
we obtain a contradiction to the conclusion of the previous lemma.
Proof of the Theorem: Suppose there exist i; j 2 I such that 'i(%; K) i !i and
'j(%; K) j !j.
By the individual rationality condition we have 'i(%; Kc) %i !i and 'j(%; Kc) %j !j.
Case 1: Suppose 'i(%; Kc) i !i and 'j(%; Kc) j !j.
By MRC2-(i) and MRC2-(iii) we can take %2 Dev which satises % jK =%K and
% jKc =% jKc , and
'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc)
'j(%; K) j 'j(%; Kc)
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Figure 8: No mutual gains
By Independence of Untraded Commodities, this is equivalent to
'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc)
'j(%; K) j 'j(%; Kc)
However, this is a contradiction to the previous lemma.
Case 2: Suppose 'i(%; Kc) i !i and 'j(%; Kc) j !j.
By MRC2-(i) and MRC2-(iii) we can take %2 Dev which satises % jK =%K and
% jKc =% jKc , and
'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc)
On the other hand, from the assumption we have
'j(%; K) j 'j(%; Kc)
By Independence of Untraded Commodities, this is equivalent to
'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc)
'j(%; K) j 'j(%; Kc)
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However, this is a contradiction to the previous lemma.
Case 3: Suppose 'i(%; Kc) i !i and 'j(%; Kc) j !j. Then we can follow the
argument similar to Case 2.
Case 4: Suppose 'i(%; Kc) i !i and 'j(%; Kc) j !j.
When jIj = 2 this is an immediate contradiction to Weak Pareto, as ! is assumed to
be Pareto-inecient in (%; Kc).
When jIj  3, from Weak Pareto and the assumption that ! is Pareto-inecient in
(%; Kc) there exists k 6= i; j such that 'k(%; Kc) k !k. By the individual rationality
condition it holds 'k(%; K) %k !k(%; K). Then we can follow the argument similar to one
of the above cases.
Likewise, there is bi 2 I such that 'j(%; Kc) j !j for all j 6= bi.
If i 6= bi we have
'i(%; K) i 'i(%; Kc)
'bi(%; K) bi 'bi(%; Kc);
which is a contradiction to the previous lemma. Therefore bi = i.
Since % jK =%0 jK and % jKc =%0 jKc for all %;%02 Dev, from Independence of Untraded
Commodities such i who takes all the gains from trade in the rst-step is common across
all preference proles.
6 Conclusion
This paper initiates a formal study of trade liberalization in a social choice context. We
have asked a very basic question: whether, in fact, the invisible hand could be modied to
guide agents in Pareto improvements when opening markets to new trade. We have shown
that the answer is negative.
As we have noted, our results do not preclude the possibility that given a preference
prole one can nd a particular path or order of trade liberalization along with everybody
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gets strictly better o. This can be easily accomplished by using the Walrasian mechanism
at each stage, taking as endowment the consumption chosen at the previous stage. However,
we have shown that it cannot happen as a property of a rule which is applied across
dierent preference proles and dierent sets of tradable commodities. This demonstrates
that any \fair" method of allocation will necessarily be path-dependent on the order in
which commodities become available for trade. Any kind of path dependence obviously
opens the door for manipulation via bureaucrats or social planners.
One possibility remains for escaping the impossibility. From the outset, we have as-
sumed that our SCF is single-valued. Dropping this constraint would require modifying
the no loss from trade condition, but at the very least, some types of generalizations seem
to pass the test. For example, consider a multi-valued rule which selects the entire Pareto
correspondence. For any ecient allocation, when opening trade in new commodities, there
is an ecient allocation for the larger set which weakly Pareto dominates the original al-
location. The issue, as we see it, remains that a multi-valued rule is open to manipulation
via bureaucrats and social planners.
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